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ANSWERED: THE FCC LOWERS THE 




A criminal trial that culminates in a sentence of incarceration affects the 
lives of many: not only the convicted individual, but also their families and 
loved ones. Inmates have few mediums through which they communicate with 
people outside of prison, one of which is the prison telephone system.1 Alt-
hough this may seem convenient, there have been various pricing obstacles 
over the years that have rendered the system problematic.2 A 2012 study from 
the Government Accountability Office found that “the quality of the interac-
tion between an inmate and family can positively affect an inmate’s behavior 
in prison and aids an inmate’s success when returning to the community.”3 
However, those familial contacts, along with their positive effects, are dimin-
ished when relatives are unable to afford the inflated rates of collect calls com-
ing from prisons.4 For instance, Fannie McKnight, an elderly woman whose 
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son was incarcerated in the Orleans Parish Prison, had to make the heart 
wrenching decision of terminating communication with her own child, because 
she could not afford the hefty phone charges.5 Families have been forced to 
“choose between keeping in touch with a relative behind bars and, in some 
cases, putting food on the table,” a decision that no one should ever have to 
make.6 
In response to years of public outcry, The Federal Communications Com-
mission (“FCC”) finally began to consider modifying the rules that control 
interstate interexchange inmate calling services (“ICS”) through the December 
2012 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“NPRM”).7 Not only did the inflated 
prices of prison phone calls negatively affect the inmates themselves, but they 
were also a detriment to the many people who yearn to stay in contact with 
their incarcerated loved ones.8 Due to the recognition of these negative effects, 
the FCC implemented a lengthy voting process culminating on August 9th, 
2013 with the enactment of brand new rules.9 
This Note begins by detailing the history of how the issue of prison phone 
call rates gained enough support to get the FCC’s attention. It starts by laying 
out examples of previously unsuccessful attempts to resolve the issue through 
the court system, and then discusses the story of Martha Wright, who spear-
headed the creation of two petitions that the FCC referenced in making its 
NPRM. After providing the historical background, this Note then discusses the 
elements of prison phone calls, detailing how they are functionally operated 
and what parties are involved in such operations. Next, the Note describes the 
FCC’s decision-making process in its entirety. First, it explains the impressions 
of various FCC Commissioners prior to undergoing the voting process. Then 
the Note enumerates relevant portions of the NPRM itself and goes on to de-
scribe the FCC’s voting timeline. Next, the Note discusses the outcome of the 
vote by describing the newly-selected rules. Then, the Note sets out the various 
arguments for why the decision to lower the rates of prison phone calls was 
necessary. The discussion begins with various policy arguments, and then ad-
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dresses the unjust enrichment, arbitrariness, and recent state trend arguments. 
Lastly, the Note gives examples of foreseeable concerns that may arise given 
the implementation of the new rules, as well as next steps for the FCC to take 
in regards to such. 
II. HISTORY 
For years, plaintiffs attempted to lower prison phone rates through the court 
system, rather than the FCC.10 However, litigation proved to be unsuccessful.11  
Advocates against the high rates for prison phone calls took an alternative ap-
proach, filing two petitions with the FCC, on behalf of Martha Wright, which 
sought to lower the call rates.12 This section will illustrate the events that oc-
curred leading up to the FCC’s recognition of the issues detailed in those peti-
tions. 
 
A. Unsuccessful Court Attempts 
  
Lawsuits challenging the overly expensive phone-rates have been unsuc-
cessful.13 In Daleure v. Kentucky, for example, the plaintiffs’ claims brought 
under the Sherman Act were undermined by the filed rate doctrine.14 The filed 
rate doctrine provides that “any entity that is required to file tariffs governing 
the rates, terms, and conditions of service must adhere strictly to those 
                                                
 10 See, e.g., McGuire v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 988, 988 (S.D. Ohio 
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the recipients challenged the excessive rates and surcharges on said calls); Miranda v. Mich-
igan, 168 F. Supp. 2d 685, 685 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (hearing a challenge to the “excessive and 
discriminatory surcharges and fees” in connection with inmate telephone calls); Daleure v. 
Kentucky, 119 F. Supp. 2d 683, 687 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (noting that the “Plaintiffs can also 
seek rate relief from the FCC, although to the best of this Court’s knowledge they have not 
chosen to do so”). 
 11 See McGuire, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (dismissing plaintiff’s antitrust claims based 
upon the 11th Amendment, state action doctrine, and the filed rate doctrine); see also Mi-
randa, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 685 (noting that although the plaintiffs had standing under the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, the state action doctrine and the filed rate doctrine barred their 
claims); Daleure, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 689–90. 
 12 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,629-30, 16,634-35. 
 13 See John E. Dannenberg, Nationwide PLN Survey Examines Prison Phone Contracts, 
Kickbacks, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, http://commcns.org/1dGAcfV (last updated Oct. 23, 
2012). 
 14 Daleure v. Kentucky, 119 F. Supp. 2d 683, 690 (W.D. Ky. 2000) (“Recognizing the 
application of the filed rate doctrine to this case has several ramifications. All Plaintiffs’ 
damages claims under the Sherman Act and Section 1983 are dismissed. Plaintiffs may, 
however, still be entitled to some form of injunctive relief.”). 
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terms.”15 The Daleure court explained that, pursuant to this doctrine, regulatory 
bodies have required that telephone companies adhere to the already approved 
rates.16 
In McGuire vs. Ameritech Services, Inc., the plaintiffs raised an Equal Pro-
tection claim to attack prison phone-calls.17 In order for a claim to succeed on 
the basis of an equal protection violation, the court must find that the state 
treated “two groups of similarly situated people differently.”18 Plaintiffs argued 
that people who receive higher priced calls from inmates are similarly situated 
to those who do not receive calls from inmates. However, the Court held to the 
contrary: 
This Court agrees that because the status of inmates cannot be considered 
similar to that of non-inmates, it necessarily follows that at those times when 
Plaintiffs communicate via telephone with inmates, they cannot expect to be 
treated in similar fashion as they and others expect to be treated at those times 
when they communicate with non-inmates via telephone.19 
A second ground for the McGuire plaintiffs’ opposition to prison phone call 
rates was an alleged violation under section 1 of the Sherman Act.20 The plain-
tiffs argued that Ohio restricted trade by denying competition in the inmate-
initiated phone call market.21 However, in rejecting that argument, the court 
applied the state action doctrine, which establishes that monopolistic actions of 
independent states are exempt from antitrust attack, in declaring that “[a]n oth-
erwise monopolistic restraint of trade will not give rise to a Sherman Act viola-
tion where it stems from a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state 
policy.”22 
A final example illustrating an unsuccessful court challenge is Miranda v. 
Michigan.23 In Miranda v. Michigan, the plaintiffs contested prison phone rates 
by alleging a violation under section 201(b) of the Federal Telecommunica-
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com Assoc. (Antitrust Modernization Comm’n May 19, 2005), available at 
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 16 Daleure, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 689. 
 17 McGuire, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 992. 
 18 Daleure, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 691. 
 19 McGuire, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1001. 
 20 Id. at 993. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, “Every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sever-
al States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” Sherman Act § 1, 15 
U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 21 McGuire, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 993, 1006. 
 22 Id. at 1006. More specifically, the Supreme Court has refused to construe the Sher-
man Act as intending to “restrain state action or official action directed by a state.” Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943). 
 23 See generally Miranda v. Michigan, 168 F. Supp. 2d 685 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
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tions Act.24 Section 201(b) states that telephone call rates “shall be just and 
reasonable” and any rate that is “unjust or unreasonable” is unlawful.25 The 
Miranda court dismissed the plaintiffs’ section 201(b) argument against Mich-
igan, because Michigan was not a “common carrier” and was, therefore, out-
side the purview of section 201(b).26  Further, the Miranda court dismissed 
plaintiffs’ section 201(b) claim against the telephone companies, because of 
the filed rate doctrine and because the FCC had primary jurisdiction over in-
mate calling services.27 
 
B. Martha Wright 
 
Ulandis Forte, convicted of manslaughter in 1994, was initially incarcerated 
in a prison facility located in Lorton, Virginia.28 Forte was later transferred to 
an Arizona prison in 1998, and then to the Federal Bureau of Prisons in 2001.29 
Martha Wright, Forte’s grandmother and a Washington D.C. resident, was able 
to visit with Forte weekly while he was incarcerated at Lorton.30 Upon his 
transfer however, Wright became disconcerted that she was paying approxi-
mately $200 per month in order to communicate with her incarcerated grand-
son by telephone.31 According to Wright, prior to her grandson’s relocation, 
she had only been paying roughly $50 a month to receive phone calls from him 
while at Lorton.32 Overall, Wright “estimates that she spent almost $1,000 per 
year on phone calls limited to 15 minutes or less.”33 Wright had no other choice 
but to communicate with her grandson by phone, because she was blind and 
eighty-years-old.34 Being blind made it even more important that rates were 
                                                
 24 Id. at 692. 
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 26 Id. at 692–93. Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952) (The 
primary jurisdiction doctrine explains that, “in cases raising issues of fact not within the 
conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discre-
tion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed 
over.”). 
 27 Miranda v. Michigan, 168 F. Supp. 2d 685, 692–93 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 
 28 Matthew Fleischer, Will ‘Middle of Nowhere’ Convince the FCC to Do the Wright 
Thing on Prison Phone Rates?, TAKEPART (Sept. 21, 2012), http://commcns.org/KVIl9P. 
 29 Justin Moyer, After Almost a Decade, FCC Has Yet to Rule on High Cost of Prison 
Phone Calls, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2012), http://commcns.org/1eMEVyS. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Suzanne Choney, FCC: Prison Phone Rates Far Too High, NBC NEWS (Jan. 3, 
2013), http://commcns.org/19ZMhl2. 
 32 Moyer, supra note 29. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Ugonna Okpalaoka, Families Fight the Cost of Prison Phone Calls, THE GRIO (Sept. 
28, 2012), http://commcns.org/1ey0Ysy. 
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affordable for Wright, since communicating via written letters was not an op-
tion for Wright and her grandson.35 Forte said, “[m]y grandmother has been 
blind for 17 years. How was I supposed to write to her? She needed to hire 
someone just to read the letters. When I called, we could only afford 2-3 
minutes.”36 
In February of 2000, inmates, family members, legal counsel, and other re-
cipients of telephone calls from inmates at prison facilities operated by the 
Corrections Corporation of America, Inc. (“CCA”) filed a class action suit to 
challenge the rates and terms of long-distance telephone calls.37 The suit al-
leged several violations including, but not limited to, the infringement of their 
rights to due process, equal protection, free speech and association, and free-
dom of contract.38 Despite these attempts, however, and in keeping with the 
rationale described above in Miranda v. Michigan, District Judge Gladys Kess-
ler dismissed the complaint and referred the case to the FCC on primary juris-
diction grounds.39 Mediation between the parties took place over the next two 
years but unfortunately no compromise was reached.40 As a result, on Novem-
ber 3, 2003, petitioners filed the first “Wright Petition” as a request for rule-
making with the FCC.41 The request asked the FCC to “prohibit exclusive in-
mate calling service agreements and collect call-only restrictions at privately-
administered prisons and require such facilities to permit multiple long dis-
tance carriers to interconnect with prison telephone systems.”42 Subsequently, 
in March 2007, the petitioners filed the “Alternative Wright Petition,” request-
ing a debit calling requirement, rate-caps, and a prohibition against per-call 
charges.43 
Tens of thousands of individuals contacted the FCC, urging it to act on the 
two Wright petitions and lower inmate phone call rates.44  Many advocates 
formed or joined campaigns for a cap on prison phone-call rates,45 such as the 
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 44 Id. at 16,660 (statement of Comm’r Clyburn). 
 45 See, e.g., Middle of Nowhere’s Campaign for Prison Phone Justice, TAKE PART, 
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Campaign for Prison Phone Justice.46 This Prison Phone Justice campaign gar-
nered support from numerous organizations including the Center for Media 
Justice, Prisoners and Families for Equal Rights & Justice, Prison Action Net-
work, and the Human Rights Defense Center.47 After ten years of petitioning, 
campaigning, and protesting, the advocates for a phone-rate cap finally got the 
FCC’s to address the issue.48 The process that the FCC took in deciding which 
of the proposed rules to implement will be discussed later in this Note.49 
III. ELEMENTS OF PRISON PHONE CALLS 
In a large number of states, certain telephone companies offer profitable 
commissions to state contracting agencies in return for monopolistic contracts 
in that state’s prison phone services.50 In the inmate calling services industry, 
the providers compete fiercely for the contracts to provide services to correc-
tional facilities.51 Once the provider acquires the contract, that successful pro-
vider has a monopolistic hold over the inmate calling services at that facility.52 
The inflated rates that the telephone companies decide to impose not only pro-
duce a profit for the telephone companies themselves, but must also account 
for the commission payments charged by state agencies.53 On average, these 
                                                                                                              
http://commcns.org/KVISbG (last visited Aug. 31, 2013); The Campaign for Prison Phone 
Justice: Who We Are, NATION INSIDE, http://commcns.org/1c77cNk (last visited Aug. 31, 
2013). 
 46 The Campaign for Prison Phone Justice: Lowering the Cost of and Ending Kickbacks 
on Prison Phone Calls, MAG-NET BLOG, http://commcns.org/1ey17fQ (last visited Aug. 31, 
2013). 
 47 NATION INSIDE, supra note 45. 
 48 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,629-30 (The FCC has noted the 
increased attention: 
[T]here has been substantial renewed interest and comment in this 
docket highlighting both the wide disparity among interstate interex-
change ICS rate levels and significant public interest concerns. We be-
lieve it is appropriate to seek comment to refresh the record and consid-
er whether changes to our rules are necessary to ensure just and reason-
able ICS rates for interstate, long distance calling at publicly- and pri-
vately-administered correctional facilities.). 
 49 See discussion infra Part IV. 
 50 Dannenberg, supra note 13 (Dannenberg observes that “[p]rison phone service pro-
viders are free to bid on contracts at the maximum rates allowed by regulatory agencies, and 
upon winning such bids are effectively granted a monopoly on phone services within a giv-
en prison or jail system.”). 
 51 Choney, supra note 31. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Dannenberg, supra note 13. See also DREW KUKOROWSKI, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, 
THE PRICE TO CALL HOME: STATE-SANCTIONED MONOPOLIZATION IN THE PRISON PHONE 
INDUSTRY 3 (2012), available at http://commcns.org/1eycXIW. 
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commissions amount to approximately 42% of gross revenues, which is an 
indication that the prison phone call industry is estimated to gross $362 million 
or more annually.54 
There are a variety of security considerations to which phone companies at-
tempt to attribute the heightened cost of prison phone calls.55 Examples of such 
security considerations include: an automated voice processing system, block-
ing mechanisms so that inmates are not able to make restricted calls, listening 
and recording capabilities, and voice overlay features that allow for the identi-
fication of the call as coming from a correctional facility.56 However, because 
those features are considered to be standard in prisons, the counter argument is 
that the price inflation can only truly be due to other factors such as increases 
in the commission payments,57 or profits the phone companies and the contract-
ing agencies are trying to make off of the inflated rate.58 In fact, in New York, 
where commission payments have been banned, the charge for local, intrastate, 
and interstate prison phone calls is a mere $0.05 per minute, which includes the 
costs for the aforementioned security considerations.59 
Typically, a contracting agency issues a request for proposal (“RFP”),60 
which begins a bidding process for providers of phone services.61 The RFP 
specifies “the number of phones, locations and technical performance stand-
ards required by the contracting agency.”62 From the RFP, phone companies 
can determine what their cost exposure will be when bidding for contracts, but 
they also need to consider the kickbacks to the contracting agencies.63 The 
three major companies that primarily control prison phone contracts are: Glob-
al Tel*Link (“GTL”), which is the largest; Securus Technologies; and Centu-
ryLink.64 According to The Prison Policy Initiative, “90 percent of the nation’s 
prisoners make calls through three companies.”65 Once these contracts are se-
cured, the types of calling methods available to inmates are either collect calls 
                                                
 54 Dannenberg, supra note 13. 
 55 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,632; Cecelia Kang, FCC to Vote on 
Lowering Prison Phone Call Costs, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2013), 
http://commcns.org/1dGAJyp. 
 56 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,629. 
 57 Moyer, supra note 29; KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 5. 
 58 Dannenberg, supra note 13. 
 59 Over 60 Organizations File Joint Letter with FCC Urging Cap on Exorbitant Prison 
Phone Rates, NATION INSIDE, http://commcns.org/1aSk5v3 (last visited Aug. 31, 2013). 
 60 See Dannenberg, supra note 13. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 2; see also Aaron Smith, FCC Votes to Reduce Rates 
for Prison Phone Calls, CNNMONEY (Aug. 9, 2013), http://commcns.org/1fnvE50. 
 65 KUKOROWSKI, supra note 53, at 2. 
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or debit-based calls.66 Collect calls, paid by the receiver of the phone call, incur 
a “per-call set up charge” as well as a “per-minute charge,” while debit-based 
calling deducts funds from an inmate’s account by a per-minute charge only.67 
Per-call charges range anywhere from $0.50 to $3.95, and per-minute charges 
from $0.05 to $0.89.68 
IV. THE FCC DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 
 
A. Outlooks of the Commissioners Prior to Voting 
 
As previously discussed, the December 2012 NPRM was the start of the 
FCC’s direct action in response to the decade of public outcry pleading for 
lower prison phone call rates.69 FCC Commissioners were ready and willing to 
take on the task of figuring out the most appropriate direction to take in pro-
posing new rules. 70  When addressing why the public should care, Acting 
Chairwoman Mignon Clyburn stated that “[m]aintaining contact with family 
and friends during incarceration not only helps the inmate, but it is beneficial 
to our society as a whole.”71 Similarly, Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel 
stated, “[t]his is not just an issue of markets and rates; it is a broader issue of 
social justice,” and that “[w]hen a single phone call may cost as much as a 
month of unlimited phone service, the financial burden of staying in touch may 
be too much for inmates’ families to bear.”72 Commissioner Ajit Pai, while 
acknowledging that he would consider possibilities for lowering prison phone 
call rates, noted that “choice and competition are not hallmarks of life behind 
bars.”73 Regardless, the decision to open a rulemaking was a unanimous one.74 
 
B. The December 2012 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
                                                
 66 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,630. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 16,629. 
 70 Choney, supra note 31. 
 71 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,660 (statement of Comm’r Cly-
burn). 
 72 Id. at 16,661 (statement of Comm’r Rosenworcel). 
 73 Id. at 16,662 (statement of Comm’r Pai). 
 74 Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Energy & Commerce Comm. of Demo-
crats, Rep. Waxman Statement on FCC Proposal to Lower Prison Phone Rates (Dec. 28, 
2012), available at http://commcns.org/1m0zyhN; see also Paul Barbagallo, FCC Proposes 
Cap on Prison Phone Rates, Explores Two Companies’ Market Dominance, BLOOMBERG 
BNA (Jan. 2, 2013), http://commcns.org/1abXHA3. 
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This section outlines some relevant portions of the NPRM that outline exact-
ly what the Wright petitioners were asking for. The FCC requested comments, 
information, and answers in response to the NPRM from the public, specifical-
ly “state departments of corrections and state officials responsible for prison 
telecommunications decision making.”75 The FCC sought these comments to 
help it determine if the then-existing rates were just and reasonable and, if not, 
how those goals could be achieved.76 
1. How Much to Charge? 
The petitioners requested a rate cap of $0.20 per minute for debit calling and 
$0.25 per minute for collect calling, for interstate long distance inmate calling 
services.77 The FCC sought comment on the elements of rate caps in general, 
and the appropriate criteria to use in determining a particular rate cap.78 More 
specifically, the FCC requested comment on their reasonableness.79 The FCC 
wanted to know what factors should determine the per-minute rate caps, 
whether the caps should be applied to both public and private institutions, and 
if there are other rate cap options available besides the per-minute rate cap.80 
The FCC wished to gather any opinions on proper implementation of the per-
minute rate caps and any foreseeable benefits or consequences resulting from 
such implementation.81 The petitioners also proposed that all per-call charges 
be terminated and replaced solely by per-minute charges.82 The FCC sought 
comment regarding the exact costs that are associated with per-call charges, 
and whether the elimination of such charges would result in reasonable rates.83 
The FCC intended to gather information on dropped calls since inmates may 
incur a second charge upon redial. 84  Petitioners suggested that this second 
charge be voided as long as a dropped call is reinitiated within two minutes of 
                                                
 75 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,635. 
 76 Id. at 16,636. 
 77 Id. at 16,635. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 16,630–33. 
 80 Id. at 16,637–38. 
 81 Id. 
 82 In re Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provi-
sions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Petitioners’ Alternative Rulemaking Pro-
posal, CC Docket No. 96-128, at 5 (Mar. 1, 2007) [hereinafter Pay Telephone Reclassifica-
tion and Compensation Provisions]. 
 83 RIICS Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 7, at 16,637. 
 84 Id. 
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the drop.85 
ICS providers use Marginal Location Methodology to calculate proposed 
ICS rates.86 Using this methodology, telephone service providers argued that 
per-call charges are necessary in order to continue funding “equipment costs 
and monthly line charges.”87 For debit calls, the implementation of this meth-
odology yields a fixed $1.56 per-call charge in conjunction with an additional 
$0.06 charge per minute.88 Collect calls yield a fixed charge of $2.49 per-call 
and $0.07 per minute.89 Similar to the per-minute rate cap inquiries, the FCC 
sought comment in regards to the reasonableness of this methodology in hopes 
of discovering whether or not alternative methodologies should be used.90 
There are also several issues surrounding commissions on which the FCC 
wanted clarification.91 Commissions from ICS providers are sometimes used to 
fund inmate services, and the FCC sought comment on what specific inmate 
services these commissions fund.92 The FCC also requested responses to the 
petitioners’ argument that rates are unreasonable under Section 201(b) of the 
Communications Act.93 Pursuant to this charge, the Commission wanted to 
know “how much these site commissions are and how much they add to per-
call costs.”94 Lastly, the FCC sought comment on how a state’s decision to re-
duce or eliminate commissions affects the rates and the ICS market.95 The FCC 
sought evidence as to a correlation between decreased rates and increased call 
volume to determine whether ICS-rate reductions encourage greater communi-
cation between inmates and families.96 
2. Method of Charging 
The only two methods of charging for prison phone calls are collect calls 
and debit calls, and the NPRM describes a collect call as “a call in which the 
called person pays for the call,” whereas a “debit call deducts the cost of the 
                                                
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 16,638–39. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 16,639. 
 91 Id. at 16,642. 
 92 Id. at 16,642–43. 
 93 Id. at 16,642–43; see also Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provi-
sions, supra note 82, at 22–23. 
 94 Id. at 16,642–43. 
 95 Id. at 16,643. 
 96 Id. at 16,639. 
142 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS [Vol. 22 
call from a prepaid account.”97 The FCC requested information about setting 
different rate-caps for debit and collect calling.98 Hinting at the implementation 
of more debit calling systems following public comment, the FCC’s questions 
primarily surrounded debit calling.99 The FCC wanted to determine exactly 
how many facilities already implement debit calling, and how the safety con-
cerns that accompany the implementation of debit calling have been handled at 
those facilities.100 In addition, the FCC solicited public comment on whether 
prepaid calling should replace both collect calling and debit calling, as previ-
ous commenters have suggested.101 Prepaid calling differs from debit calling 
because it allows families to purchase minutes in advance, as opposed to de-
ducting money from the inmate’s account.102 
Petitioners in the First Wright Petition also requested that the market for ICS 
calls be opened up to competition, which, in turn, would “prohibit collect call 
only restrictions in privately-administered correctional facilities.”103 The FCC 
sought comments from the public in order to figure out how these exclusive 
contracts affect ICS rates, and how opening up the market to competition could 
procedurally be accomplished.104 Also, the FCC needed clarification regarding 
the rationale behind the collect-calling restriction because petitioners in the 
First Wright Petition argued that the inflated costs are “not outweighed by cor-
responding benefits.”105 
3. Other Features 
In the Alternative Wright Petition, petitioners suggested that inmates should 
receive a certain number of “no-cost” calls each month, in exchange for phone 
company discretion to increase the per-minute rate cost of such calls.106 Specif-
ically, petitioners proposed that if caps of $0.275 per minute for collect calling 
and $0.22 per minute for debit calling occur, then phone companies should be 
required to give each inmate 20 minutes of free calling per month.107 The FCC 
solicited public comment about the proposal generally and whether or not legal 
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issues arise with the implementation of this type of system.108 
In addition, the FCC also sought comment regarding Billing-Related Call 
Blocking, which involves ICS providers whom are either unwilling or unable 
to reach agreements with Local Exchange Carriers (“LECs”) in providing bill-
ing services to customers who receive collect calls from prisons.109 Due to this 
failure or unwillingness, those companies block calls that go out to customers 
of LECs in locales where billing agreements have yet to be reached.110 Petition-
ers argue that implementation of debit calling will avoid the necessity to block 
calls.111 The FCC sought comments from the public to clarify the accuracy of 
that argument, they sought information on how many calls are actually blocked 
on a monthly basis, and if there are any ways other than debit calling where 
billing-related call blocking can be prevented.112 
Lastly, it has been suggested that calls made by inmates with hearing disa-
bilities via teletypewriter equipment technologies (“TTY”) are four times long-
er than calls made via telephone from inmates without disabilities.113 Therefore, 
inmates with hearing disabilities, as well as their families, have to pay even 
more than their “hearing counterparts.”114 For example, the family of a deaf 
person incarcerated in Maryland paid $20.40 for a call placed via Telecommu-
nications Relay Service (TRS), a type of TTY telephone service, that lasted a 
mere nine minutes.115 In addition, the record shows that TTY phone calls are 
accompanied by yet another fee for having to connect to the TTY operator.116 
The FCC sought comment to determine whether inmates with hearing disa-
bilities really are paying more for ICS services, and, if so, for what reasons.117 
The Commission also drew attention to Section 276(b)(1)(A),118 which exempts 
hearing-disabled TTY calls from the Commission’s “per call compensation 
plan,” seeking comment regarding how this exemption will affect the examina-
tion of rates for disability inmates.119 
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C. The Voting Process 
1. Legal Framework 
The FCC not only sought public comment relating to the issues and inquir-
ies present in the NPRM described above, but it is also sought comment on its 
ability to exercise authority under the relevant laws: Section 276 of the Com-
munications Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), specifically section 276(b)(1)(A), 
as well as section 201(b).120 Section 276(b)(1)(A) governs the Commission’s 
regulation of payphone services, detailing specifically how to proscribe regula-
tions that promote competition among payphone service providers: 
Establish a per call compensation plan to ensure that all payphone service 
providers are fairly compensated for each and every completed intrastate and 
interstate call using their payphone, except that emergency calls and telecom-
munications relay service calls for hearing disabled individuals shall not be 
subject to such compensation.121 
The FCC sought comment to establish the extent of its authority to address 
ICS matters under this section of the 1934 Act.122 Similarly, the FCC sought the 
same insight with regard to its authority to regulate ICS under section 201(b) 
of the 1934 Act, which states that “[a]ll charges, practices, classifications, and 
regulations for and in connection with such communication service, shall be 
just and reasonable, and any such charge, practice, classification, or regulation 
that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful.”123 The new rules will 
only apply to interstate ICS rates since states have regulatory power over calls 
within their own state.124 However, the FCC requested comment on ways to 
encourage states to also reconsider their intrastate ICS rates.125 
2. Voting Timeline 
Having released the NPRM in December 2012, the FCC accepted public 
comment until March 25, 2013.126 Commenters were permitted to submit reply 
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comments in response to those submitted before the March deadline until April 
22, 2013.127 To facilitate the decision-making process, the FCC conducted a 
day-long workshop on July 10, 2013 to discuss public policy implications, how 
individual states have handled rate reform thus far, possible implementation 
procedures, amongst other things.128 On August 9, 2013 the FCC Commission-
ers voted on the new rules, releasing an official Order (“the Order”) detailing 
the rules on September 26, 2013.129 The rules go into effect 90 days after their 
publication in the Federal Register.130 
V. THE FINAL DECISION 
In implementing these new rules, the FCC “took long-overdue steps to en-
sure that the rates for interstate long-distance calls made by prison inmates are 
just, reasonable and fair.”131 The Commission adopted the Order, which strikes 
a balance between addressing security concerns, ensuring fair compensation 
for service providers, while also keeping the rates reasonable for consumers.132 
The FCC is now requiring that prison phone call rates be based solely on the 
cost of providing the service.133 Therefore, correctional facilities are no longer 
permitted to accept commission payments from phone companies, factoring 
the amount of commission into the decision of which company will obtain a 
contract.134 The Order adopted rate caps for both debit/pre-paid calls and col-
lect calls, imposing a rate of no more than $0.21 and $0.25 per minute respec-
tively.135 With these rates, debit and pre-paid calls can be no more than $3.15 
for a 15-minute call, and collect calls can be no more than $3.75. If any com-
pany wishes to charge in excess of the rate caps, a request for a waiver show-
ing good cause has to be filed and granted.136 Despite implementing the cap, the 
FCC goes on to suggest that $0.12 and $0.14 are the truly “just, reasonable and 
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cost-based” rates for debit/prepaid and collect calling respectively.137 There-
fore, any company that charges at or below that standard will be exempt from 
enforcement actions under the Order.138 The aforementioned rates still will al-
low prison facilities to implement various security precautions such as call-
blocking, call verification, recording systems, and restrictions on three-way 
calling and forwarding.139 The FCC also clarified that users with hearing and 
speech disabilities may not be charged higher rates.140 Lastly, the FCC has im-
plemented requirements mandating data collection, annual certification, and 
the enforcement of other provisions that will ensure that the Order is complied 
with.141 The Order was decided upon in a 2-1 vote, with Acting Chairwoman 
Clyburn and Commissioner Rosenworcel in favor of the Order and Commis-
sioner Pai dissenting.142 Ulandis Forte, Martha Wright’s grandson, sat in the 
audience as Chairwoman Clyburn and Commissioner Rosenworcel delivered 
the results of the vote.143 Overcome with emotion, “[h]e wiped tears from his 
eyes when the vote was taken.”144 
VI. THE FCC’S DECISION TO LOWER RATES WAS 
IMPERATIVE 
There are a myriad of arguments in support of the FCC’s decision to lower 
prison phone call rates. As a policy matter, rates should have been lowered 
because it will alleviate a heavy economic burden from the families of in-
mates,145  facilitate continued relationships between incarcerated parents and 
their children,146 and reduce recidivism rates and negative prison behaviors.147 
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In addition to the policy arguments, the FCC made the right decision in lower-
ing the rates because high rates not only unjustly enrich telephone companies 
and state agencies,148 but are also arbitrary in nature.149 Lastly, the FCC should 
have felt compelled to regulate the rates because there was already trend 
emerging among states to implement lower rates.150 
 
A. General Societal Policy Arguments 
1. Decreasing the Burden on Family Members 
Not only do the high costs of prison phone calls negatively affect the inmate, 
but they also cost their families and loved ones millions of dollars every 
year.151 This is especially true in situations where the inmate is using collect 
calling services to contact their loved ones because, unlike debit calling where 
the charges are deducted from the inmate’s personal account, with collect call-
ing, the charges stemming from the prison phone call are paid directly by the 
family.152 Often times, prisons are located hundreds of miles away from an in-
mate’s hometown.153   Therefore, low-income families suffer the most; since 
they cannot afford to travel, phone communication is often their only option.154 
This puts families in extremely compromising positions because they have to 
choose between spending their already limited funds on unnecessarily exorbi-
tant phone call rates, and simply not speaking to their incarcerated loved ones 
at all.155 Grappling between the desire to answer phone calls from incarcerated 
family members, and the lack of funds to support the costs of such phone calls, 
families have suffered the unfortunate consequence of losing their telephone 
service due to unpaid phone bills.156 Similarly, some families “had . . . been 
evicted from their apartments,” while “ [o]thers took second jobs merely to 
afford the cost of the collect calls coming from prison.”157  Civil liberties advo-
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cates have argued that the burden of coping with the pain of having a loved one 
incarcerated is enough to deal with, and that families should not be saddled 
with the extra problems that these phone rates bring.158  With these new rules 
having been implemented, families will be more able and willing to accept 
collect calls from prisons, instead of feeling like they are doing themselves an 
economic disservice simply by staying in contact with their incarcerated rela-
tives.159 
2. Maintaining Relationships With Children 
Children of incarcerated individuals are disadvantaged in more ways than 
one.160 The Vera Institute of Justice conducted a study where it found that chil-
dren with incarcerated parents suffer from “ambiguous loss,” a grieving pro-
cess similar to that experienced by children with deceased parents. 161  This 
problem affects over 2.7 million children nationwide.162 Sadly, many children 
who have an incarcerated parent lash out in school, use drugs to cope, and of-
ten commit crimes themselves.163  In addition to that, “[l]ack of regular contact 
with incarcerated parents has been linked to…homelessness, depression, [and] 
aggression…in children.”164 Arguably, the aforementioned problems are exac-
erbated when children are not able to maintain contact with an incarcerated 
parent.165 Given the fact that most inmates come from a family of low econom-
ic means, traveling to visit a parent in prison is not always a reasonable op-
tion.166 Therefore, telephone communication may be the only primary way that 
children can salvage any type of consistent connection with their incarcerated 
parents.167  However, if prison phone rates are too expensive for families to 
afford, communication between incarcerated parents and their children will be 
either inconsistent, or completely non-existent. 168  Therefore, “the ability to 
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have regular telephone contact could mean the difference between a child hav-
ing hope or a child experiencing anguish during a parent’s incarceration. It 
could also mean the difference between a child who feels loved in spite of a 
parent’s incarceration and a child who feels abandoned.” 169  Therefore, the 
FCC’s new rules will give each and every child a chance to reap the benefits of 
remaining connected to their parents, despite them being behind bars.170 
3. Reducing Recidivism Rates & Negative Prison Behaviors 
The new rates will not only benefit the inmates and their families, but socie-
ty at large as well.171 “High phone rates reduce incarcerated persons’ ability to 
communicate with family, and family contact has been consistently shown to 
lower recidivism.”172 Additionally, a 2004 Urban Institute study found that in-
mates who maintain close family relationships were more likely to secure em-
ployment and less likely to use drugs after release than those without such rela-
tionships, based on higher mean scores of 3.51 versus 3.34, and 3.31 versus 
3.18, respectively.173 The Federal Bureau of Prisons declared that maintaining 
ties to the community affects an inmate’s personal development, and an in-
mate’s family is an instrumental part of that development.174 In fact, the com-
munity impact and recidivism studies, which originally uncovered the correla-
tion between family contact and inmate recidivism, were the very reason for 
introducing the prison phone call system in the first place.175 
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Acting Chairwoman Clyburn addressed this issue by commenting that 
“[w]ith seven hundred thousand individuals released every year from these 
institutions, it is crucial that we do whatever we can to strengthen family ties 
before these individuals return home.”176  Even prison officials have expressed 
disapproval when companies attempt to increase rates notwithstanding the po-
tential for their own personal benefit through kickbacks.177 For example, in 
2002, when GTL wanted to increase rates in Tennessee, the Department of 
Corrections’ Commissioner at the time explained that “maintaining contact 
with family and friends in the free world is an important part of an inmate’s 
rehabilitation and preparation to return to the community. . . . [Rate increases] 
would hinder . . . the aforementioned departmental objectives.”178 The state of 
Wisconsin is headed in the appropriate direction with regard to assisting in-
mates in this rehabilitation process: it has a law that requires that prison offi-
cials promote communication between an inmate and his or her support system 
because doing so leads to successful reintegration.179 
Reduction in recidivism rates not only benefits the public for safety reasons, 
but monetary ones as well.180 Recidivism is an extremely expensive behavioral 
trend, and it is the taxpayers who are responsible for footing the bill.181 Any 
potential profits that will be lost as a result of lowering prison phone call rates 
are far outweighed by the costs repeat offenders produce.182 Therefore, it would 
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seem, as a matter of a simple cost-benefit analysis, that it is more economically 
efficient to have lowered the rates.183 All in all, “[o]vercharging inmates is not 
just unfair but also counterproductive, because it discourages inmates from 
keeping in touch with a world where they will be expected to fit in.”184 The 
new rules that the FCC have implemented will help decrease recidivism and its 
associated costs—yet another reason why the FCC should have implemented 
them.185 
With regard to inmate behavior while incarcerated, Congress found that 
those inmates who were able to interact with their families were less likely to 
be involved in negative incidents within the prison, and were more susceptible 
to having their sentences reduced.186 Moreover, maintaining connections with 
family, particularly parent-child relationships, gives the inmate a “greater stake 
in good behavior.”187 
From a prison security standpoint, high phone rates are also associated with 
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inmates resorting to illegal means of contacting their families.188 Contraband 
cell phone usage has become a widespread problem in prisons, and ironically, 
“the market for cell phones behind bars is driven in part by the exorbitant rates 
charged by prison phone companies; prisoners use illegal – but much more 
affordable – cell phones to stay in touch with their families and friends.”189 The 
new rates will therefore, in turn, lower the probability of contraband cell phone 
usage in prisons as well as the accompanied security risks.190 
 
B. Prevents Unjust Enrichment 
 
There is a fairness argument supporting the rationalization to lower prison 
phone call rates.191 Essentially, the phone companies that acquire monopolistic 
contracts from state agencies and prison facilities are being unjustly enriched 
as a result of “charging much higher rates than those paid by the general pub-
lic.”192 Similarly, the commissions received from phone companies in return for 
granting those contracts unjustly enrich the agencies.193 As discussed previous-
ly, companies and agencies facing backlash from this accusation primarily ar-
gue that “the higher rates are due to the security features their technology has, 
such as monitoring phone calls and blocking numbers.”194 However, the fact 
that these features are standard and so readily available to the public is in direct 
opposition to the notion that they are the cause of the inflated prices.195 In fed-
                                                
 188 See Dannenberg, supra note 13. See also Putting an End to Illegal Cell Phone Use in 
Prisons, FCC Workshop/Webinar on Contraband Cell Phone Use in Prisons (Sept. 30, 
2010), available at http://commcns.org/1jLR50t (“Contraband cell phones have been used 
by inmates to arrange the murder of witnesses and public safety officers, traffic in drugs, 
and manage criminal enterprises. This illegal practice jeopardizes the safety of America’s 
communities and public safety officials.”). 
 189 Dannenberg, supra note 13. 
 190 RIICS Report & Order, supra note 4, ¶ 44. 
 191 See Dannenberg, supra note 13. See also Madeleine Severin, Is there a Winning Ar-
gument Against Excessive Rates for Collect Calls from Prisoners, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1469 (2004) (characterizing the prison phone call rate problem as “reach[ing] out and 
goug[ing] someone”); Nationwide Research Finds Excessive Prison Phone Rates Exploit 
Prisoners’ Families, NATION INSIDE, http://commcns.org/1iND2aG (last visited Mar. 9, 
2013) (characterizing the prison phone call rate problem as “gross profiteering at its worst”). 
 192 Dannenberg, supra note 13 (Lucrative prison phone contracts profit not only the tele-
phone companies, but the rates are further inflated to cover huge commission payments paid 
to state agencies that average forty-two percent nationwide and account for $152 million in 
extra annual costs paid by the families of prisoners.). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Choney, supra note 31. 
 195 Id. See also Ben Iddings, The Big Disconnect: Will Anyone Answer the Call to Lower 
Excessive Prisoner Telephone Rates, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 159, 174-75 (2006) (suggesting 
that excessive rates are driven by lucrative commissions, not operating costs which have 
decreased with technological advances). 
2014] INTERSTATE PRISON PHONE CALLS 153 
eral prisons, not only is technology used to monitor phone calls, but the system 
still makes a profit, all the while remaining affordable for consumers.196 In 
short, the commissions and inflated prices are motivated by profits on the part 
of phone companies and state agencies.197 In fact, in 2001, Louisiana declared 
that when deciding what company to award a contract to, the highest number 
of voting points would be awarded to the bidder that proposed the highest per-
centage of compensation.198 Similarly, in 2007, Alaska admitted that the com-
mission rate—also known as a “kickback”199—was the most influential factor 
when considering bidders for contracts.200 These kickbacks increase the costs of 
the calls, a cost borne by the consumer.201 The great expense of prison phone 
calls reflects the public’s unawareness of the costs of prison, and it stems from 
the state’s desire to have a source of revenue to fund other programs within the 
prison.202 However, the commission payments are also used for expenses that 
have nothing to do with the inmates, such as employee salaries and benefits, 
renewal funds, personnel training, and states’ general revenue funds.203 The 
relatives and friends who must pay for these things, more often than not, have 
limited means to begin with.204 Therefore, instead of giving phone companies 
and state agencies the uninhibited discretion to set their own rates, rate caps 
have been rightfully mandated, which will in turn better protect the prisoners’ 
familial bonds.205 
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C. Addressed Arbitrariness of Rates 
 
Prison phone rates nationwide have been described as “a patchwork of 
charges that simply cannot be correlated to providing the same basic telephone 
service.”206 Not only do these rates vary greatly between different states, but 
within states as well.207 These extreme differences remain even when the tele-
phone services are supplied by the same company.208 Additionally, the method 
by which customers are charged for prison calls often varies.209 
As an example of these variations, the Prison Policy Initiative found that the 
cost for a 15-minute, interstate phone call could cost $2.36 in Massachusetts 
and $17.00 in Georgia.210 Overall, most states charge a connection fee of $3.00 
or more with per-minute fees of up to $0.89 for interstate calls.211 These rates 
result in customers paying anywhere from $10.00 to $17.00 just to talk on the 
phone for no more than 15 minutes.212 “This is a far cry from the much lower 
long distance rates paid by the non-incarcerated public, which typically run 
$.05 to $.10 per minute or simple flat rate monthly fees for unlimited long dis-
tance calling in the $50.00-80.00 a month range.”213 However, in polar opposi-
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tion to the majority, there are states such as New York, where interstate calls 
cost $0.48 per minute, with no connection fee at all.214 New York’s rates are 
one twenty-fifth the cost of Washington’s, the state with the highest interstate 
rate.215 
Local calls differ from intrastate calls in that, while still made to recipients 
in the same state, they are only considered local if the recipient is in “a small 
area around the call’s originating location,”—for example, calls within the 
same city.216 States differ widely in the structures that they set for their local-
call rates; some states implement flat rates, others impose rates that include 
both a connection fee as well as a per-minute charge.217 These variations result 
in costs ranging from as low as a flat $0.50 for 15 minutes in North Dakota, 
South Carolina and Florida, to $6.20 in Colorado, which charges a $2.75 con-
nection fee, as well as a $0.23 per-minute charge.218 Intrastate rates vary signif-
icantly, as well.219 For example, New York charges a mere $0.048 per-minute 
fee for intrastate calls, amounting to $0.72 for a 15-minute call,220 while Ore-
gon not only charges a $3.95 connection fee, but a $0.69 per-minute fee as 
well.221  Effectively, New York callers and recipients are paying less than a 
dollar to talk to their incarcerated family members for 15 minutes, but Oregon 
customers are paying $14.30 to do the exact same thing.222 
The costs of prison phone calls continues to diverge widely amongst juris-
dictions, even when the same company provides the services, further evidenc-
ing a revenue-driven model.223 As an illustration, Rhode Island’s “no kick-back 
commission low rates,” are provided by GTL, which is the same company that 
charges some of the highest rates in the country in states where commissions 
are paid.224 Even though GTL provides services in both states, it costs $10.70 to 
place a 15-minute interstate collect call in Arkansas, while doing the same in 
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Rhode Island only costs $5.80.225 “It is readily apparent that the service provid-
ed, i.e., prison-based phone calls, is profitable for GTL even at the company’s 
lowest rates; thus, the higher rates charged in states where GTL pays commis-
sions amount to nothing more than price gouging and gross profiteering.”226 
Unfortunately, this “kickback-based business model” is commonly used since 
GTL provides services to the majority of prison facilities throughout the coun-
try.227 
Phone companies have been charging customers at rates that generate reve-
nue.228 However, the reality of that injustice was irrelevant because once there 
was a contract obtained, families had no choice but to tolerate the rates even if 
they seemed unfair and were inflated.229 The FCC can now put an end to com-
panies’ ability to take advantage of customers with interstate calls by the insti-
tution of these new and improved rules. 
 
D. New Rule Mirroring Recent Trends 
 
Some states seem to have been one step ahead of the FCC prior to it’s new 
decision.230  Several states actually voluntarily changed their own prison phone 
call rates and instituted new policies.231 Eight states have already banned the 
commissions that are paid by the phone companies to state contracting agen-
cies.232 States that have banned commissions are the same states where some of 
the lowest rates for prison phone calls are instituted.233 For example, “Missouri 
charges [ten] cents a minute for a long-distance phone call with a one dollar 
connection fee.”234 By means of comparison, after banning commissions, pris-
on phone call rates dropped 61% in California, 87% in Michigan, and 69% in 
New York.235 Although not completely eliminated, Arkansas, Kansas, and New 
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Hampshire have reduced the commission rates used in those states while Mon-
tana, similarly, has entered into a “limited-commission contract.”236 As a result, 
rates decreased 50% in Arkansas, 40% in Kansas, and 64.5% in Montana.237 In 
the District of Columbia, there is a maximum rate determined by the Public 
Service Commission of the District of Columbia that precludes the imposition 
of any commissions or charges that result in customers paying in excess of that 
rate.238 
The Louisiana Public Service Commission (LaPSC) became inspired by the 
efforts of the aforementioned Campaign for Prison Phone Justice and their at-
tempts at combating against the high costs of interstate prison phone calls.239 
After witnessing the FCC finally start to take these concerns seriously by issu-
ing the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Louisiana state officials voted to low-
er rates by twenty-five percent.240 Foster Campbell, LaPSC’s Commissioner, 
declared that it was “morally wrong” to be imposing high fees on some of the 
poorest people in the state of Louisiana.241 The LaPSC faced opposition by crit-
ics arguing that lowering costs would negatively affect public safety.242 How-
ever, LaPSC found that the twenty-five percent reduction would not negatively 
affect the ability to screen calls.243 
As a policy matter, the FCC should feel confident in the decision to lower 
prison phone call rates because states had already begun to jump on board.244 
Even other government agencies, such as the Immigration Customs and En-
forcement (ICE), moved towards lowering rates.245 ICE charges only $0.12 per 
minute for nationwide calling, without charging commissions or any other ad-
ditional fees.246 Clearly, there is a societal trend emerging amongst states that 
points in the same direction the FCC was leaning towards prior to it’s deci-
sion.247 This, consequently, only further supports the FCC’s decision to finally 
lower the prices of prison phone calls. 
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VII. FORESEEABLE CONCERNS AND NEXT STEPS 
Dissenting Commissioner, Ajit Pai expressed concerns with implementing 
these new rules. Although acknowledging that the problem with prison phone 
call rates should have been addressed years ago, “he could not vote for the 
proposal because it was too complex, and he was uncertain the commission 
could enforce it.”248 Essentially, Commissioner Pai is concerned that the Order 
has the potential to spark lawsuits against the FCC.249  In addition to that, the 
FCC has admitted that in accordance with keeping rates “just and reasonable,” 
for the benefit of both the users and service providers, the elimination of com-
mission payments may impede certain prison facilities’ ability from imple-
menting social welfare programs for inmates.250 In order to address and antici-
pate concerns, as well as ensuring that “interstate and intrastate ICS are pro-
vided consistent with the statute and public interest,” the FCC has issued a Fur-
ther Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“FNPRM”). In the FNPRM, the FCC 
seeks comment on reforming intrastate rates, additional issues regarding tele-
phone services for deaf inmates, the impact of new technology on interstate 
rates, the possibility of implementing quality of service standards, amongst a 
variety of other issues.251 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Contracts that allow phone companies to profit from inflated rates, and state 
agencies to profit from unnecessarily high commissions are socially regres-
sive.252 These profits are often procured at the expense of economically disad-
vantaged families.  These families are forced to decide whether to face eco-
nomic hardship and pay the excessive rates, or cease contact with their loved 
ones who are behind bars.253 Sadly, the profit-motives of contracting agencies 
and phone companies have taken an overwhelming priority over the known 
rehabilitative benefits that lowering the rates will generate.254 Decreasing recid-
ivism rates, preventing negative prison behaviors, maintaining relationships 
with children and removing the burden from innocent families are all factors 
that will positively affect a far greater number of people than would the unjust 
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enrichment of a couple of telephone companies and state agencies.255 “Notably, 
the only ones satisfied with the status quo are the phone companies … and cor-
rections departments … Outside of those with a financial interest in the prison 
phone industry, the consensus – ranging from concerned members of Congress 
. . . to thousands of affected consumers nationwide – is for reform of exorbitant 
prison phone rates.”256 
As a policy matter, the rules set forth in the Order are by no means an un-
heard of, or inconceivable course of action.257 The movement towards lowering 
prison phone call rates has already received a substantial amount of support 
from advocacy organizations nationwide, and even began to manifest itself as 
various states decided to change their own laws in accordance therewith.258 
Although there are several concerns and challenges that the FCC will have to 
address in the near future regarding this decision, the new rules will finally 
give inmates a real chance at rehabilitation, while simultaneously lifting an 
economic burden off low-income families’ shoulders.259 In the words of Acting 
Chairwoman Mignon Clyburn, “[i]t’s been a long time coming, and not in time 
to directly benefit Mrs. Wright, but a change has finally come.”260 
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